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Introduction
Governments often use public subsidies or tax credits to foster private innovative activities, aiming to increase the competitiveness of firms in a jurisdiction. Existing studies have already analysed the effect of public innovation support on private R&D/innovation 1 (Cerulli 2010: 445) Therefore, this paper analyses whether publicly induced innovative activities foster the competitiveness of the companies supported. Regarding the aims of public innovation support programmes, supported companies should become more competitive as a result of receiving support. In Asplund (ed. 2000) , different authors analyse the Finnish Tekes programme 2 and find mixed results, while a recent study by Becker (2013) also finds mixed results in Germany.
However, these existing studies focus on single countries or on a comparison between only a few countries or a small number of companies.
Accordingly, this study enlarges the picture by adding a European perspective, with fifteen European countries included. In particular, it analyses the development of labour productivity With these three factors, this paper expands the analysis of effectiveness of public innovation support, evaluating the supported companies regarding competitiveness in Europe.
An overview on the existing landscape of public innovation support within the EU is provided in the first part of section two, which shows that the vast majority of twenty European countries offer either subsidies or tax cuts and subsidies for private R&D investment. 1 Within the overview, R&D includes other innovative activities, as mentioned in European Commission (2013) or Busom et al. (2012) . Therefore, R&D is always used synonymously with R&D&I and innovation in general in this paper.
Tekes is the innovation support agency in Finland (Tekniikan edistämiskeskus -Center for Advancement of Technology).
A brief overview of the literature forms the basis of this study, before different measures to evaluate the effectiveness of public support in general are elaborated from existing studies.
The hypotheses, developed in the third section, show the different aspects of effectiveness of innovative activities and subsidies. Section four describes Eurostat's Community Innovation Survey (CIS); in particular, the chosen method of matching supported and not publicly supported companies is presented due to the problem of non-randomness of selection. The results and conclusions of the analysed data are presented in the fifth section, before section five concludes. Lithuania and Sweden, all countries offering public innovation support grant both direct subsidies and tax credits (see Table 1 ).
For the OECD members, Busom et al. (2012: 2) Nonetheless, in terms of those countries using both instruments simultaneously, differences in the relation become visible (see Busom et al. 2012: 38) . Czarnitzki et al. (2011 ), Duguet (2004 and Grossman et al. (1994: 37-8) investment in R&D and innovation. 3 Duguet (2004: 272) for France, Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004: 16) for Belgium and Czarnitzki and Fier (2002: 17-8)-18) as well as Lehmann and Stierwald (2004: 128) for Germany show the additionality of public innovation support. Furthermore, Busom (2000: 133) for Spain and Görg and Strobl (2007: 17) ) for Ireland stress that crowdingout can be ruled out at least for several companies -e.g. domestic firms that received small grants in Ireland -while these two studies do not completely rule out crowding-out. Krohmer's (2010: 51) meta-analysis of 57 studies focusing on R&D support in Germany also shows no general crowding-out of private investments. Thus, this paper assumes at least partial additionality and at most partial crowding-out in the EU.
Additionality of public innovation support in Europe
Outside the EU, Wallsten (2000: 97-8) shows crowding-out in the United States, whereas Levy (1990: 172) ) and Hall and van Reenen (2000: 462) find different results. Hall and van Reenen (2000: 462) describe that one dollar of public innovation support generates one additional dollar of private investment in North America. For state programmes in the USA, Atkinson (1991: 563) finds differences in the effectiveness between states; for instance, it is higher in Michigan and
Pennsylvania compared with Illinois and Massachusetts.
Regarding the private investment induced, a similar study by Fier and Czarnitzki (2005: 4) for Germany shows a smaller effect of €0.28 of private investment induced by one euro of public spending. By contrast, Hussinger (2008: 743) also finds a complete additionality of R&D for the German manufacturing sector, whereby one euro of public subsidies on R&D stimulates another euro of private R&D investment.
A recent study by Radicic and Pugh (2013: 18) shows that public institutions face a selection problem, which reduces the positive effect of public innovation support. Public institutions have a tendency towards a 'picking the winner' strategy to evade information problems about the firms applying for innovation support, as Cantner and Kösters (2012: 932-3) outline. These factors reduce additionality and thus lead to a greater degree of crowding-out.
Nonetheless, regarding additionality, the empirical results in Europe present a clear picture that public innovation support induces additional private innovative activities and crowding-out is at least not a general problem.
Effectiveness measures of public support
With respect to the effectiveness of public innovation support, a first indicator of the effects towards the entire society is defined with the social rate of return (Griliches 1992: 31-2) .
Nonetheless, this indicator remains very abstract and difficult to implement empirically.
A comparison of different innovative support schemes -such as between Finland and Germany in Czarnitzki et al. (2007) -also shows effects of public innovation support on R&D activity similar to those mentioned in section 2.2. Clausen (2009: 242) distinguishes between 'far from the market' (research) and 'close to the market' (development), concluding that support 'far from the market' stimulates private R&D more strongly and with a higher social rate of return (Clausen 2009: 251) .
Regarding the effect on a company's sales, Hussinger (2008: 743) shows a positive effect of both R&D efforts in general and publicly induced R&D efforts on the new product sales of a company in Germany.
For Finland, Lehtoranta analyses the growth pattern and labour productivity of firms supported by the 'Tekes' programme, suggesting that public innovation support positively influences both the growth pattern (Lehtoranta 2000: 27) and labour productivity (Lehtoranta 2000: 31-2) . In the same book, Maliranta (2000b: 61-2) finds a less clear effect on productivity growth in general:
while he highlights a positive effect at the industry level, the observations of one period had to be removed as outliers before finding a positive effect.
SMEs particularly benefit from industry-specific R&D support (Maliranta 2000a: 117) . Job creation is only supported for private R&D, while the effect for publicly-financed R&D is 'ambiguous' (Maliranta 2000a: 117) . A recent paper by Pajarinen and Rouvinen (2014) R&D investment increasing a company's employment, but they also argue that process innovations are generally labour-unfriendly.
Analysing the development turnover and return on sales, Becker (2013: 13) finds unclear results for the influence of public innovation support granted by the state and the European level in
Germany (see Table 2 ). A positive impact is only clearly supported at the federal level.
Generally, the empirical evidence shows a certain ambiguity and mainly small effects are detected independent of the indicator. Aside from one study that uses a very small dataset, none of the studies analyses the EU as a broader entity. As indicators, labour productivity in Finland, sales in Germany or employees in Spain or Europe form an interesting basis for the further analysis of competitiveness. Although political actors claim increased competitiveness to be one main aim of public innovation support (Atkinson 1991: 573) , the effect is unclear in other studies (González Cerdeira and Pazó Martínez 2008: 385) . A detailed analysis of different aspects is necessary, as Maliranta (2000b: 70) claims that 'the return to R&D seems to be clearly negative for mediumsized firms only', whereas Lang (2009 Lang ( : 1438 suggests that 'recent data seems to confirm the positive effect of research input on productivity dynamics'.
Therefore, positive average treatment effects of the treatment is expected.
Hypothesis 2: Public support for private R&D investment increases a firm's competitiveness.
Public innovation support is justified through potential under-investment in R&D due to the problem of uncertainty and the non-excludability of the results of successful innovation projects.
Therefore, reducing under-investment results in increased competitiveness for the company supported. Moreover, other influences also have to be considered, including the general market surrounding and the situation in a country.
All countries with public innovation support claim the aim of fostering their innovativeness and the competitiveness of their economies by supporting R&D. Therefore, an effect at the microlevel is a necessary precondition for achieving the aims at the macro-level. Maliranta (2000a: 106) ascertains that 'manufacturing firms supported by Tekes have been able to create jobs in net terms at a considerable rate since 1994', thus supporting this hypothesis.
A positive yet smaller effects of the public support variables in the regressions is expected.
Hypothesis 3: Different countries achieve different levels in their effectiveness of public innovation support.
Resulting from hypothesis 3, as well as different support schemes and innovative frameworks in the different EU Member States, differences between countries exist, including in the effectiveness of public innovation support. One such example of a difference is between Luxembourg and Portugal, which are the countries that, in recent years, have seen the highest increase in public R&D support: while Luxembourg already had a very high level of public innovation support, Portugal has merely built up its innovation support from scratch in recent years. Moreover, while Luxembourg only has half a million inhabitants and about 2,500 square kilometres, Portugal has 10.5 million inhabitants and a land area of more than 92,000 square kilometres. These factors prompt different effects, which influence the effectiveness of innovation support. For example, the control of public support is easier in Luxembourg, increasing the effect in comparison with Portugal, whereas the variety of firms supported is probably higher in a larger country with a more diversified economy, which creates a positive effect for Portugal compared with Luxembourg -in addition to other country effects.
Accordingly significantly different dummy variables for at least some of the participating countries are expected.
Data and methods

Data
Eurostat's CIS offers the possibility to use harmonized data 6 for the relevant EU Member States.
I use data from the 2008 data wave, which include more variables concerning the total amount of R&D spending in a firm compared with later data waves. Regarding the questions mentioned, the dataset uses data from almost all the countries mentioned above that offer public innovation support. Some countries such as Cyprus, Finland, Italy or Sweden are dropped due to having either missing data or data that are not harmonized. Problems in the harmonization of the CIS are well described in Mairesse and Mohnen (2010: 1147) , prompting the need for stronger harmonization, at least for some core variables. Additionally, firms complete the CIS questionnaire subjectively, which also creates problems (Mairesse and Mohnen 2010: 1137) .
As the CIS is an unbalanced panel, 7 the analysis uses the data as cross-sectional data.
Nonetheless, the variables for turnover and the number of employees are included lagged from both 2006 and 2008. Although this is not a classical lag by a panel, the questionnaire includes a question concerning the same figures from two years before. However, these two variable pairs are used to calculate differences in turnover and employee numbers, as well as labour productivity. The sample comprises 29,451 firms. 
Propensity score matching
With data from a non-experimental setting, the assumption of randomness is questionable, as mentioned by Klette et al. (2000: 478-9 Additionally, Radicic and Pugh (2013: 20) find the problem of 'cherry picking', which will further reduce the randomness. Accordingly, the institutions granting public support often pick those firms that have a higher likelihood of becoming a successful example (see also Cantner and Kösters 2012: 932-3).
Methodologically, the approach of Becker (2013) has to be expanded by measures to reduce the potential problems of biased data. Due to the relatively high number of observations in the CIS, a control group of not-supported yet innovatively active firms can be created to test not only for hard factors, but also for some softer, less-observable ones. I apply propensity score matching (nearest neighbour matching) to find companies similar to those supported. 8 With a structural probit estimation on the support as the dependent variable and several controls as independent variables, propensity scores are calculated and used to find a firm with no public innovation support with similar firm characteristics. During this matching, the average treatment effects of the treated (ATTs) are also calculated with Leuven and Sianesi (2003) . Czarnitzki et al. (2007 Czarnitzki et al. ( : 1354 show that due to the lack of potential instrumental variables as well as longitudinal panel data, propensity score matching is a reliable approach using CIS data.
OLS regression
In addition to these treatment effects, I study the influencing factors on turnover, employment and labour productivity development.
For this analysis, I run an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) on the differences of the three aforementioned variables with several firm characteristics as explanatory variables. As all three variables are continuously available in the dataset, I do not reduce them to dummy variables but rather calculate the differences. The coefficients are highly different due to the very different scales of turnover, the number of employees and labour productivity (as turnover per employee), although the effects become visible.
In order to reduce the problems mentioned in the previous sub-section, the weights calculated during the propensity score matching are implemented to weight the OLS regression. When an observed firm is the nearest neighbour for not only one but several other firms in the sample, its impact is higher in both the propensity score matching process and the OLS. This increases the robustness of the OLS regression but reduces some of the coefficients.
Variables
Due to data restrictions, I focus on three dependent variables. In line with earlier studies, the development of turnover (dturnover, difference to the reference period in euro) and the number of employees (dempl, difference to the reference period in employee numbers) are analysed.
Based upon these two variables, I calculate the labour productivity as turnover per employee, 9 including its differences between 2006 and 2008 (dturnemp, difference to the reference period in euro per employee). The differences are calculated to show whether a positive or negative development is found, as well as the amplitude of this development across the two years.
The effect of R&D on productivity reflects an inverted U-shaped curve, as Lang (2009 Lang ( : 1442 ascertained. Therefore, the effect of R&D activities has to be examined with a time lag, which is included in the dataset by measuring the activities in the last two years with two different variables in the general cross-sectional data. These lags should further mitigate the problem of endogeneity (Lee 2011: 263 (2014) and Leuven and Sianesi (2003) , Std. Err. does not take into account that the propensity score is estimated; *** denotes significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level, x as mentioned in the text close to significance. Stata (2014) after propensity score matching with Leuven and Sianesi (2003) , observations are weighted with the weights of the matching process; *** denotes significance at 1% level; ** at 5% level; * at 10% level.
Results
The estimations provide ambiguous results: while the average treatment effects for all tested variables are insignificant, several firm characteristics show significant influences on the different measures of competitiveness.
However, the influences on the ATTs reported in Table 4 are unclear: regarding the three competitiveness indicators, the effects are negative for turnover and employment and positive for labour productivity, although none is significant. The same is true for the variables indicating whether a firm introduced a new product (or service), process, organizational procedure or market innovation, as well as the turnover of new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm innovations.
The ATTs for product (and service) and organizational innovations are positive but not significant, while the ATTs for process and marketing innovations as well as the ATTs for turnover of new-to-the-market or new-to-the-firm products are negative and not significant.
The general insignificance only shows in the tests with country dummies to reduce countryspecific effects. By contrast, in a second version with explanatory variables for political systems, a negative ATT on process innovations turns significant at the 5 per cent level, while labour productivity and the likelihood of a new product innovation are close to significance (and both positive). All other ATTs remain (highly) insignificant.
Nonetheless, I observe effects of the explanatory variables in the OLS regressions (Table 5, page 14) on the development of the three competiveness indicators.
All five explanatory variables and several country dummies significantly influence the differences in turnover between 2006 and 2008, whereby the reception of public funding strongly reduces the turnover by more than €6 million. Furthermore, I also examine similar findings for companies that regularly undertake R&D activities. By contrast, the coefficient for firms that invest more money in R&D marks a higher turnover, while the coefficients for SMEs and foreign-owned companies show lower turnovers after the two years. Both coefficients are higher than the first effects, with €8 million for SMEs and €22 million for foreign companies. Country effects on turnover strongly influence Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal and the Slovak Republic.
In the second regression on the change in the number of employees, I recognize weak significance for a negative coefficient of regularity, indicating a reduction of 7.5 employees, and a positive coefficient for foreign-owned companies, marked by an increase of 10.7 employees.
The effect of the R&D expenditure is positive and highly significant, indicating that a one percent increase in R&D expenditure increases the number of employees by 0.075, while the negative coefficients for funding and SMEs are insignificant. Country-specific employment effects are evident for Spain, France, Hungary and the Netherlands.
The third regression provides the following results for labour, with productivity measured as the change in turnover per employee between 2006 and 2008.
With a coefficient of almost €22,000 per employee, the reception of public innovation support shows a highly significant and positive coefficient. As in the two previous regressions, R&D expenditure shows a positive and significant (at a 5 per cent level) coefficient. By contrast, the weakly significant coefficient for foreign-owned firms is negative, with slightly above €22,000 per employee. Only the country effect for Hungary proves significant in this regression.
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It is important to mention that the explanatory power of the OLS regressions is very low, which is unsurprising given that other factors have a much stronger impact on turnover, employment and labour productivity development compared with my explanatory variables. The explanatory power is further reduced by the combination with the matching approach, while the nonsignificance of the ATTs also supports these findings. Nonetheless, part of these variables influences the competitiveness measures and thus reflects one possible instrument for policy makers.
Conclusion
Owing to the ambiguous results, drawing conclusions is somewhat difficult. For instance, the presented analysis shows no significant effects of public innovation support on the average treatment effects, leading to a rejection of the hypotheses (especially hypothesis 2), although significant coefficients in the OLS regression, support at least partially the hypotheses.
While the regularity of R&D does not show clear influences on the three indicators of competitiveness, the amount of money spent on innovative activities always has a positive and significant influence; accordingly, a firm with more money spent on innovations has a higher turnover, more employees and a higher labour productivity, thus supporting hypothesis 1.
The effect of public innovation support mentioned in hypothesis 2 is mixed: while it shows a negative and significant coefficient for the turnover development, whereby companies that received public innovation support ceteris paribus show lower turnover differences, the effect on employment is not significant (but also negative). By contrast, the coefficient for public innovation support in the regression on the differences of labour productivity is highly significant and positive. The results reveal a positive effect on labour productivity, although negative effects on employment and turnover. In terms of competitiveness, firms receiving public support can be seen as more efficient due higher labour productivity, although declining turnovers can also be seen as an indicator for a negative trend in the market. Therefore, my results regarding hypothesis 2 are ambiguous and thus this hypothesis is to be rejected.
With respect to the country effects, different countries show different results; however, as the effects vary between the different regressions and -apart from Hungary -no country shows statistically significant effects in all three estimations, the effect is unclear. Nonetheless, differing country-specific effects exist and thus hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected, but is weakly supported.
It is important to mention that the results of my OLS regressions with their low R² values have to be considered carefully: regarding the development of employees and labour productivity -as well as turnover development, to a lesser extent -other indicators have stronger impacts.
Nonetheless, the public support programmes are one common tool that policy makers often use across Europe. Moreover, the European analysis shows that there are indicators for the effectiveness of public innovation support programmes that extend beyond the literature on additionality. However, further research at both the European and the national levels is required, as the results are ambiguous and only show weak influences on competitiveness.
For policy makers, this prompts the need to evaluate innovation support more closely, focusing on the original objectives, namely supporting companies that face barriers to innovate (Fernández-Ribas 2009; Becker 2015 ) the effects on competitiveness have to be addressed both in the policy making process and later in the accountability of institutions that grant support.
However, these two objectives might also enter into conflict, given that while it is positive for the aim of effectiveness to focus on larger and generally more successful companies that already have an advantage, such a policy would clearly reduce the opportunities for companies such as SMEs with barriers to innovate to participate in innovation support.
This leads us to the question of political preferences and different programmes at different political levels. As economists, it is not our role to decide upon this question, but a higher transparency in the targets -and their conflicts -of support programmes and their deployment would help to simplify the decision-making process of policy makers, thus increasing the transparency of the process. 
